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Abstract 
 
In this paper, a three-party controlled quantum secure direct communication protocol based on GHZ-like 
state is proposed. In this scheme, the receiver can obtain the sender’s two-secret bits under the 
permission of the controller. By using entanglement swapping, no qubits carrying secret messages are 
transmitted. Therefore, if the perfect quantum channel is used, the protocol is completely secure. The 
motivation behind utilizing GHZ-like state as a quantum channel is that if a qubit is lost in the GHZ-like 
state the other two qubits are still entangled. The proposed protocol improves the efficiency of the 
previous ones. 
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1. Introduction 
Quantum cryptography    , is a branch of quantum information science which prepares an absolute way to 
ensure the security of communication. Quantum cryptography began by discovering of quantum key distribution 
(QKD). The first QKD protocol (BB84) was proposed in         , by Bennett and Brassard. Quantum 
cryptography developed so rapidly that nowadays other branches of this field exist. They can be categorized into 
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC)       , quantum secret sharing (QSS)        , quantum 
state sharing (QSTS)        , deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC)         and so on.  
In contrast to QKD        , QSDC permits the secret message to be transmitted directly without first sharing 
a private key. The works on this research field attracted a great deal of attention and can be divided into two 
groups, one utilizes single photons       the other is based on entangled states    . Many kinds of channels in 
QSDC have been applied such as Bell state      , GHZ state         , W state        , GHZ-like state 
        and so on. 
The first QSDC protocol was proposed by Beige et al., in           The scheme is based on single photons. 
In the same year, Bostrӧm and Felbinger     presented a ping-pong QSDC scheme by using     pairs. However, 
their scheme is not secure in a noisy quantum channel    . One year later, Deng et al.,      presented a two-step 
QSDC scheme, using EPR pairs. In all these QSDC schemes, the qubits carrying the secret message are sent in a 
quantum channel. So, Eve can have a successful attack and she is able to steal some part of the secret message. 
To solve this problem, Yan et al.,      presented a QSDC scheme based on EPR pairs and teleportation. In this 
scheme, the receiver can find out the secret message with the help of sender’s classical information. Also, no 
qubits carrying secret message are transmitted. Therefore, this protocol is unconditionally secure, if the perfect 
quantum channel is used. 
Recently, a new type of QSDC, controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC), has attracted lots 
of attention. In CQSDC scheme, a sender can communicate with the receiver under the permission of a controller. 
In fact, without the controller’s admission, the receiver cannot get any part of the secret message. In          , 
                                                        
 Corresponding author at: Department of Electrical Engineering, Imam Reza International University, Mashhad, Iran Tel.: 
+98-882-179-9. 
 E-mail address: shimahassanpour@yahoo.com. 
 
  
Xia et al., presented a CQSDC scheme by using GHZ entangled state via swapping quantum entanglement. 
Another quantum channel that has been applied nowadays is W states     .  
In recent years, some researchers have worked on QSDC in which GHZ-like states are used as a quantum 
channel. The most important property of GHZ-like state is that its entanglement is maximally robust under 
disposal of any one of the three qubits     . This new branch of QSDC needs lots of attentions in order to be 
developed. GHZ-like state can be produced by a single qubit state, an EPR state and a CNOT operation. We can 
demonstrate them as Eq.     : 
 
      
      
 
  
                                                           
      
      
 
  
                                                     
      
      
 
  
                                                         
      
      
 
  
                                                      
      
      
 
  
                                                          
      
      
 
  
                                                      
      
      
 
  
                                                           
      
      
 
  
                                                     
 
In     , Gao et al.,      proposed a CQSDC scheme based on three-qubit GHZ-like state as a quantum 
channel. In     , Dong et al.,      proposed another CQSDC scheme based on GHZ-like state and imperfect 
Bell state measurement. Also, they utilize the controlled quantum teleportation technique. In their scheme, the 
receiver can get one-bit secret message from transmitter under the permission of a controller. One year later, 
Banerjee and Pathak      proposed a QSDC scheme in which a sender transmits three secret messages to a 
receiver. Also, in this protocol the qubits carrying the secret messages are transmitted in a quantum channel. In 
that year, Kao and Hwang      proved that in Gao et al.’s scheme     , the receiver can reveal the whole secret 
message without the controller’s permission. Also, in     , an improved scheme       was presented by Kao and 
Hwang to avoid this flaw.  
Based on the GHZ-like state property, many researchers utilized it as a quantum channel           , in this 
paper, a CQSDC protocol is proposed. In this scheme, three-particle GHZ-like states are produced by a sender, 
Alice. The second particle of each GHZ-like state is transmitted to her agent, Bob and the third particle is 
transmitted to a controller, Charlie. After preparing the quantum channel, Alice encodes her two-bit secret 
messages, by applying pre-defined unitary operations. Then, Bob can get the secret messages with his 
measurement’s result and classical bits that received from Alice and Charlie. Also, we did not use teleportation 
technique. But, we utilize entanglement swapping for transmitting two-bit secret messages. As a result, the 
proposed scheme is unconditionally secure if perfect quantum channel is applied. The results will show our 
scheme improves the efficiency of the previous work.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A brief review on CQSDC schemes which utilize GHZ-like 
state as a quantum channel is presented in Section  . In Section  , proposed CQSDC protocol is presented in 
details. The security analyses are investigated in Section  . In Section  , the comparison and efficiency analyses 
are given. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section  . 
 
 
2.       Previous CQSDC schemes based on GHZ-like state 
In this section, previous CQSDC protocols which utilize GHZ-like state as a quantum channel are reviewed. 
First, it is essential to introduce some important basis measurements that are being applied in QSDC protocols. 
The  -basis is              . Also, the  -basis is              , where             are defined as Eq.    ,  
 
      
 
  
                    
 
  
                                                                                                                               
 
The Bell states are denoted as Eq.    , 
 
         
 
  
                     
        
 
  
                                                                                                    
   
 
2.1. Dong et al. scheme   
This protocol consists of four steps as follows: 
Step   The controller, provides   three-particle GHZ-like states as Eq.    , 
 
         
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
  
He sends particles one and two of each GHZ-like state as   and   sequences to the sender and receiver and 
keeps the third particles as   sequence for himself. 
Step   For checking the security of quantum channel, the receiver randomly selects  -basis or  -basis 
measurements. Then, he performs it on his particles that he picked them out for eavesdropping check. Also, 
the sender and the controller apply the same measurement basis on the corresponding particles that the 
receiver announced their positions. So, by comparing their results, the communicators can evaluate the error 
rate. 
Step   If the quantum channel is secure, the controller measures his particle in the  -basis and announces his 
results publicly. So, the two communicators can start their communication. For sending secret message, the 
sender produces extra qubit;       for     and       for    . Then, she measures her two particles on Bell basis 
measurement and announces her result as a classical bit to the receiver.  
Step   After the receiver gets the classical bits, he applies  -basis measurement on his particle. By comparing 
his results and the sender’s classical bits, he can find out the secret message. 
 
2.2. Kao et al. scheme   
This protocol is implemented by the following steps: 
Step   The controller provides a sequence of three particle GHZ-like state as Eq.    . He sends particles two 
and three of each GHZ-like state for Alice and Bob as a transmitter and receiver. Also, he maintains the first 
particles for himself.          
Step   For eavesdropping check, three legitimate users pick up randomly enough particles for eavesdropping 
process. Then, they apply appropriate measurement basis and discuss publicly about the entanglement 
relation between these particles. So, by checking their outcomes they can evaluate the error rate. 
Step   If the channel is secure, the sender encodes her secret message. She creates an extra particle depending 
on her secret message that she wants to transmit. If her secret message is          , she produces             . 
Then, she performs Bell measurement on her two particles and transmits her result as classical bits to the 
receiver. 
Step   In this step, the receiver applies unitary operations according to the classical bits received from the 
sender and the controller. Finally, by performing  - basis measurement he can find out the secret message. 
 
3. The proposed QSDC protocol  
In the proposed protocol, we suppose that Alice attempts to transmit her secret messages to Bob under the 
control of Charlie. The scheme can be achieved in four steps. The first step is the preparation in which a quantum 
channel is prepared. The second step is security checking that the security of the quantum channel is discussed. 
The third step is secret communication where the sender encodes her secret messages. Finally, the decoding 
process is discussed in the last step which is called message extraction. Let us start by illustrating entanglement 
swapping used in the first step. Then the details of the proposed protocol are discussed. 
 
Entanglement swapping 
Entanglement swapping      is one of the most fascinating aspect of quantum communication. This method 
can entangle two particles which have never interacted. This feature is illustrated with two EPR pairs in which 
particles one and two are entangled together and particles three and four are entangled together. Also, the sender 
has particles one and four and the receiver has particles two and three in their possessions. In this case, if the 
sender performs a Bell state measurement on her particles, the state collapses and the receiver’s particles 
become entangled with each other as follows:  
 
           
        
 
  
                     
 
  
                     
                             
 
 
          
         
        
          
        
         
        
         
                            
 
 
          
         
        
         
        
         
        
         
                            
 
 
          
         
        
          
         
          
         
                                                 
                                 
 
According to Eq.    , if the sender’s result is         , the receiver’s outcome will be  
        that are maximally 
entangled states. Also, similar entanglement swapping can be utilized in other Bell states. 
 
  
3.1. Preparation phase   
In this scheme Alice produces large enough number      of three-particle GHZ-like state which is denoted as 
Eq.    , 
 
    
         
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
  
where a, b, c represent the three qubits in a tripartite GHZ-like state and         . These GHZ-like states can 
be defined in    groups as:                                                               Alice divides the 
series of GHZ-like states into three sequences.      and   sequences are composed of the first, the second and 
the third particles respectively.  
 
                                                                           
                                                                            
                             
 
Alice divides   sequence into many groups. Each group is composed of two particles, particles        and 
       as group one, particles        and        as group two, etc. Then, she sends   and   sequences to Bob 
and Charlie respectively. Also, Bob and Charlie do the same as Alice for storing their particles.  
After Bob and Charlie affirm that they have received the sequences, Alice chooses randomly some groups 
for encoding her secret messages. The remaining groups are taken as checking groups for ensuring the security 
of the quantum channel. 
 
3.2. Security checking phase 
Step   Alice randomly chooses one of two measuring bases,  -basis or  -basis, to measure her particles. After 
that, she announces the order of the particles, the measuring basis and the results of her measurement. The 
GHZ-like state can be written in  -basis as Eq.    , 
 
            
         
 
  
                                                                                                                                                
    
Step   Bob and Charlie perform their measurements under the same measuring basis on each of the 
corresponding particles.  
Step   They compare their measurement’s results. According to Table  , measurement results of the users 
should be correlated, if there is no eavesdropper. If the error rate is more than the threshold, they abort the 
protocol; otherwise, they execute the next state. 
   
Table  . The measurement bases and corresponding measurement results. 
 
Basis Alice’s state  Bob’s state  Charlie’s state  
   
                  
                  
 
 
   
                  
                  
                  
                  
 
 
 
3.3. Secret communication phase   
Step   After ensuring the security of quantum channel, Alice encodes her secret messages on the remaining 
groups of   sequence. She applies the Pauli operations defined in Table   on her first particle in each group. 
The Pauli operations are defined as Eq.    : 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
                                                                                                      
                
                             
                 
                                                                                        
                
                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
Table  . Defined operations for encoding two bits secret 
messages. 
 
Secret Message Operations 
          
        
        
        
 
As an example, if Alice wants to send     , she performs    operation on the first particle of group one. 
The state of the whole system which is prepared of particles              , will be as Eq.    : 
 
               
          
         
          
    
                                                        
                   
 
 
                                               
            
                                                                      
                  
                                                                     
                
                                                                     
                    
                   
 
   
             
           
          
           
          
                                    
           
          
           
          
                                    
           
          
           
          
                                    
           
          
           
                                                                                                             
        
As we can see in Eq.    , the entanglement swapping has been applied.  
Step   Alice asks Charlie to perform Hadamard operation on his two particles in a group. The Hadamard matrix 
    is defined in Eq.     ,  
 
         
 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
 
According to Eq.     , the state is changed into        
 
  as follows:  
 
                
 
  
 
 
             
           
          
            
          
           
          
           
               
                                   
           
          
            
          
           
          
           
           
                                   
           
          
            
          
           
          
           
           
                                    
           
          
            
          
           
          
           
             
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
       After Charlie performs Hadamard operation, he measures his particles in a group in Bell states. If the 
measurement result is        or  
      , he sends     as a classical bit to Bob; if the measurement outcome is 
       or  
     , he sends     to Bob.  
Step   After Alice finds out that Charlie finished his work, she measures her particles in Bell states and 
transmits a classical bit to Bob as Charlie did.  
 
3.4. Message extraction phase 
Step   Bob apply exclusive-or gate of a classical bit with Charlie’s information. If Bob receives      or     , he 
considers     and if he receives      or     , he considers     as the classical bit. Then, he performs 
suitable unitary operation as Table   shows. 
  
Step   After performing unitary operation, he measures his particles in Bell states. Now, Bob can infer the secret 
messages that Alice has sent to him. Actually, he compares his measurement’s result with Alice’s outcome. 
The results of this communication are shown in Table  . 
 
Table  . Relation between the measurement results, classical information, Bob’s 
                                                operation and the secret message. 
 
 
Alice’s 
Result 
 
Charlie’s 
Result 
Classical 
Information 
 
A to B           C to B 
 
Bob’s 
Unitary 
operation 
  
Bob’s 
Result 
 
Secret 
Message 
         
        
                         
      
 
 
   
         
        
                        
        
                 
                         
    
                
                        
       
         
         
                        
        
         
         
                         
     
                
                        
       
                 
                         
    
         
         
                         
     
 
 
   
         
        
                        
       
                
                         
     
                
                        
        
         
        
                        
       
         
        
                         
    
                
                        
        
                
                         
     
         
        
                         
      
 
 
   
         
        
                        
        
                 
                         
    
                
                        
       
         
        
                        
        
         
        
                         
     
                
                        
       
                
                         
    
         
        
                         
     
 
   
         
        
                        
       
                
                         
     
                
                        
        
         
         
                        
       
         
         
                         
    
                
                        
        
                
                         
     
 
 
4. Security 
In the proposed scheme, because of using entanglement swapping, no qubits carrying secret messages are 
transmitted in a quantum channel. Also, only in the preparation phase Eve may have an attack. So, if the quantum 
channel between Alice, Bob and Charlie is secure, the protocol will be unconditionally secure. 
In this section, three important security phases are discussed. In the first phase, the security of the scheme 
without the controller’s permission is investigated. In the second phase, the security of the proposed scheme 
under the control of Eve is studied. Finally, in the third phase, two kinds of attacks that Eve may use them in the 
preparation phase are analyzed. 
 
4.1. Security analysis without the controller’s permission 
One of the most important concerns in the design and analysis of CQSDC protocols is that the receiver 
cannot obtain any part of the secret message without the permission of the controller. In the proposed protocol 
as we can see in Table    the receiver cannot get any part of the secret message without the controller’s classical 
  
information. As an example, if Alice’s classical information sending through classical channel is     , Bob 
cannot find out the secret message correctly. According to Eq.     , all of the secret messages have the same 
probability. 
 
                                                              
 
 
                                                
                                      
 
where       indicate the secret message and Alice’s classical information respectively. 
 
4.2. Security analysis by displaying all of the classical information 
According to Table  , if all of the classical information is displayed, Eve cannot get any part of the secret bits. 
We can demonstrate it as follows: 
 
                                                                  
 
 
                  
                                                           
 
where         indicate the secret message and Alice’s and Charlie’s classical information respectively. 
According to Eq. (13), Eve cannot distinguish the secret bits correctly. In fact, because of appearing all the eight 
possible classical information for each two-bit secret message, she cannot get any part of the secret message. 
 
4.3. Types of Eve’s attacks in a quantum channel 
In this section, three kinds of attacks that Eve may utilize in the preparation phase are analyzed        . The 
first one is the intercept- and- resend attack, the second one is the controlled- not attack and the third one is the 
entanglement-and-measure attack. These attacks are described as follows: 
 
4.3.1. Intercept-and-resend attack 
In this attack, Eve captures and measures the transmitting particles in   or   basis randomly and sends the 
replacement qubit prepared in the state she measured to Alice (or Charlie). In this action, Eve cannot get any 
useful information. In fact, because of no correlations between Alice’s (or Charlie’s) particles and the fake ones, 
Eve’s attack will be found during the security checking phase. Suppose Eve’s measurement basis is  . In the 
security checking phase, if the users choose  -basis, according to Eq.     Eve’s attack would not be detected and 
when the users basis is   as described in Eq.     , her existence would be detected with     probability. 
 
 
 
                                   
 
  
          
                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
  
                                           
Also, suppose Eve’s measurement basis is  . If the users choose   basis, According to Eq.     Eve’s interface 
would not be detected and when the users basis is   as demonstrated in Eq.     , her existence would be detected 
with     probability. 
 
 
  
                  
 
 
                                                                                                           
 
4.3.2. Controlled-not attack 
In this attack, Eve intercepts the qubit sent from Bob to Alice (or Charlie) and then she performs controlled- 
not gate to add an additional qubit on every GHZ-like state. She wants to find out the secret message by 
measuring these additional qubits. Here we find out the error rate where Alice’s (Charlie’s) qubit is controller 
and Eve’s qubit is target. The state of the whole system after Eve’s operation will be as Eq.     , 
 
        
 
 
                                                        
                  
 
 
                                                                                                        
 
  
After measuring the qubits in the security checking phase, the Eve’s existence can be detected with probabilities  
of 
 
 
         and     ,if the measurement basis is   and   respectively. 
 
4.3.3. Entanglement-and-measure attack 
In this kind of attack, Eve produces auxiliary particles      
 , and entangles them with a particle   (or  ) before 
Alice (or Charlie) received it. Also, Eve uses unitary operation    , on the pair of particles   (or  ) and her 
particle  . We can describe it as Eqs.         ,     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                
 
 
                                                                                                              
                
 
 
                                                                                                              
 
where       
 , and  indicate the state of      
 , and Alice’s (or Charlie’s) particles respectively. The unitary operation 
is describe as Eq.     , 
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After Eve performed unitary operation, she resends the particle  , to the legal receivers. The state of the 
whole system will be as Eq.     , 
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According to Eq.      and Table  , the Eve’s existence can be detected in the security checking process with 
probabilities of 
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   if the user’s measurement basis is   
and  , respectively.  
 
 
5. Comparison 
 
In this scheme, we use the idea of entanglement swapping to transmit secret messages. In contrast to the 
scheme of Banerjee et al.,     , no qubits carrying the secret messages are transmitted in the proposed protocol. 
One of the disadvantages of transmitting the qubits that carry the secret messages is, the security of the quantum 
channel must be checked two times. Also, in the both schemes of Dong et al.,    ], and Kao et al.,     , 
teleportation techniques have been utilized. Actually, they produce extra qubits for encoding one- bit secret 
messages. But, in this paper, by using entanglement swapping two-bit secret messages have been transmitted to 
the receiver. 
In addition, the important factor that can be applied for comparing the performance of protocols is efficiency 
       . In quantum communication protocols, it is defined as Eq.     , 
 
                                                                      
  
     
                                                                                                              
 
where   ,    and    indicate the number of secret bits, the number of total qubits and the number of classical 
bits respectively. Since transmission of qubits is more complex and expensive than the classical bits, we can 
redefine the efficiency as Eq.     ,  
                                                          
                                                                  
  
  
                                                                                                                   
 
Table   shows the efficiency comparison of the proposed protocol with the previous schemes. It is obvious 
that the efficiency of the proposed protocol is higher than Dong et al.’s and Kao et al.’s in both definitions. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table  . Efficiency comparison of different protocols. 
 
protocol                      
Dong et al.               
Kao et al.               
Proposed 
protocol 
                  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In the present scheme, three-party quantum secure direct communication protocol based on three-particle 
GHZ-like state is proposed. In order to transmit two-bit secret message, entanglement swapping is utilized. 
Therefore, no qubits carrying the secret messages are transmitted. Also, this protocol is unconditionally secure, if 
the perfect quantum channel is used. 
In this scheme, after sharing three-particle GHZ-like state between users, Alice encodes her two-bit secret 
messages by applying defined unitary operations on her particles. Also, the controller applies Hadamard 
operation on his particle. After that, Charlie and Alice use Bell measurement on their particles and announce the 
results outcomes to the receiver. Then, the receiver performs unitary operation on his particle according to the 
classical bits that he received. Then, he can find out the secret messages by measuring his particle. In addition, if 
the controller does not cooperate with the others communicators, they cannot have a successful communication. 
Maybe, the receiver cannot distinguish the correct information. By this protocol, the efficiency is improved 
compared with previous works. 
In the future, we want to extend this protocol to a controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct 
communication. In other word, the two legitimate users can exchange their secret messages under the permission 
of the controller, simultaneously. 
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